H5N1: WA Needs to Step Up It’s Game!
I’ve been raising the alarm about H5N1 preparedness since the start of the year, and I’m deeply concerned about what we are seeing unfold as more cases in pelagic birds emerge.
I’ve repeatedly raised these concerns through ministerial correspondence, members statements and parliamentary questions. Gaps in operational preparedness remain and confusion amongst the public is growing due to lack of agency accountability and unclear or conflicting public messaging.
Last Friday, as WA’s fifth positive case was confirmed, this time in the Perth Metro region, I sent an open letter to Agriculture and Food Minister, Jackie Jarvis and Environment Minister, Matthew Swinbourn calling for action now to fix the gaping holes before it’s too late.
Read my letter below
Dear Minister Jarvis,
As I observe Western Australia's response to the arrival of H5N1 on our shores, it is becoming increasingly clear that significant gaps in operational preparedness remain. Reports from wildlife protection organisations – which are largely underfunded charities - and concerned constituents are frequently highlighting critical failures in coordination, accountability and on-ground response that demand urgent attention.
Since early this year, I have repeatedly raised concerns about HPAI preparedness through ministerial correspondence, a Member’s Statement in Parliament, and Parliamentary Questions. I now raise them once more in this open letter.
In April, I raised concerns about avian influenza preparedness with you through Questions on Notice (No. 1292). I asked a straightforward question:
Which agency is responsible for collecting and disposing of deceased infected birds when both the Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (DPIRD) and the Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions (DBCA) advise that this is not their responsibility?
Your response stated:
"National, state and territory governments have developed guidelines and public information on the management of wildlife carcasses. Landowners and land managers should undertake an appropriate risk assessment which factors biosecurity, environmental and public health considerations to determine whether carcasses should remain in situ or be removed for off-site disposal."
This advice does not answer the fundamental question of who is accountable for managing potentially infected wildlife in public spaces.
In practice, government agencies are directing members of the public to contact their local government. Local governments, in turn, are referring residents back to DPIRD or DBCA. This circular referral process has created uncertainty, confusion and a clear absence of accountability.
The major consequences of this confusion are now obvious. Once samples have been collected for testing, deceased pelagic birds are being left to decompose on public beaches because no agency accepts responsibility for their removal. This is completely unacceptable.
This lack of coordinated action has serious consequences:
Residents are unsure who to contact and are increasingly concerned about the potential spread of disease to wildlife, companion animals and people.
The Emergency Animal Disease Hotline is receiving multiple reports about the same deceased birds, diverting valuable resources and reducing the system's efficiency.
Scavenging birds and other animals are at obvious risk of exposure to potentially infected remains, creating further (and completely avoidable) opportunities for disease transmission.
Furthermore, current public messaging instructs people to avoid, record and report sick or dead wildlife. However, once those reports are made, there is often no clear pathway for action. Compounding this confusion, some members of the public have reported being advised by DBCA's Wildlife Care Helpline to take sick birds into their care, in complete contradiction of the national guidelines.
To date, all confirmed infected birds have been found on public land, however as the outbreak expands, infected wildlife will inevitably be found on private property. Under the current approach, landowners and land managers, likely with no training or expertise in biosecurity, infectious disease management or public health will be expected to determine for themselves whether the bodies of potentially infected birds should be handled and removed.
This is an extraordinary expectation to place on the public. There is no readily available guidance explaining how these risk assessments should be undertaken, what factors should be considered, or what constitutes a safe course of action. In the absence of clear leadership and operational responsibility, ordinary Western Australians are being left to make decisions with potentially catastrophic consequences for the spread of this contagious disease.
During a national biosecurity emergency, this lack of accountability is unacceptable.
These operational shortcomings are occurring alongside another critical gap, the preparedness of Western Australia's wildlife rehabilitation sector.
For the past 12 months, WA's six largest wildlife rehabilitation organisations have worked closely with DPIRD and DBCA to prepare for the arrival of H5N1. Together, they have identified practical measures that would strengthen the state's response and improve protection for wildlife, volunteers and veterinary teams.
Those organisations are now calling for urgent emergency funding to provide:
Additional personal protective equipment (PPE).
Additional staffing to meet significantly increased biosecurity and operational demands.
Temporary biosecure facilities that will allow wildlife rehabilitation centres to safely continue caring for birds if H5N1 spreads to resident, non-migratory species on the mainland.
While additional PPE and staffing are somewhat rapidly actionable, the creation of biosecure wildlife facilities is not. They require planning, development approvals, construction and fit-out before they are operational. Wildlife rehabilitation organisations need certainty that should H5N1 emerge in local bird populations, the Government will provide the funding required to continue their work.
Importantly, in response to my questions, you confirmed that "Under the National Management Agreement for H5 HPAI in wildlife, up to $30 million is available nationally for cost-sharing of approved, eligible response activities." The funding mechanism exists. What is needed now is the commitment to activate it before the situation escalates.
The Government has had time to prepare. The expertise exists. The risks are well known, practical solutions have been identified, and the support required by frontline wildlife organisations should already be in place. The priority now is ensuring those recommendations are implemented before they are overtaken by events.
I write to you to reiterate the call for urgent funding from Western Australia's wildlife rehabilitation sector and to emphasise that they need confirmation of government support now, not once it's too late.
At the same time, I call on the Government to clarify agency responsibilities, implement a coordinated response strategy and provide clear public guidance that reflects the seriousness of this biosecurity threat.